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A small corner of the world:
Organized crime in the TBA
Gary W. Potter, PhD.
Professor, Criminal Justice
Eastern Kentucky University
Note: This is a draft of a section of the manuscript published as Lyman, M.
and G. Potter. 2011. Organized Crime 5th edition. Prentice-Hall
The area where the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet seems
an isolated; very out of the way place for an unprecedented convergence of
transnational organized crime groups to occur. The Tri-Border Area (TBA)
has become a major haven for drug and arms trafficking groups, money
launderers, and sexual traffickers. In the seemingly remote cities of Ciudad
del Este and Foz do Iguacu, over $12 billion is laundered every year. Ciudad
del Este is the commercial center of the TBA generating $13 billion a year in
commercial transactions, both legal and illegal. Much of this business is
generated as a result of the city’s position as a transshipment point in the
robust drug and arms trafficking business.
The TBA hosts criminal organizations from around the world. But, it also
has its own indigenous organized crime groups from Paraguay and Brazil.
These native syndicates have helped to create a hospitable environment
which hosts organized crime groups from Chile, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia and Taiwan. The
counterfeiting of CDs and CD-ROMs, as well as other pirated products,
links local syndicates with foreign partners in Asia and the Middle East.
Illicit commerce in the TBA is enhanced by virtually nonexistent
immigration controls and pervasive governmental corruption. False identity
documents, passports and visas, particularly Paraguayan, are easily obtained
in the TBA. Police and other government officials suffer from low pay;
inadequate or nonexistent training; miserly funding from their central
governments; bank secrecy laws, and very weak money laundering controls.
In an atmosphere of pervasive governmental corruption and human rights
abuses, corruption flourishes.

Geography, Society and the Economy of Crime
The TBA region is defined geographically by three main population centers:
Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Foz do Iguaca, Brazil, and Ciudad del Este,
Paraguay. Paraguayan economic planners tried to enhance the tourism
business at Iguaza Falls, by creating a free-trade zone in the Ciudad del Este
area. The hope was that Argentineans and Brazilians would cross the border
in search of inexpensive merchandise, particularly electronic products. The
net result, however, was the creation of a free trade zone for transnational
organized crime groups.
Between 1971 and 2001 the population of the TBA increased dramatically
from about 60,000 to more than 700,000, primarily as a result of the
construction of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam. In addition, the TBA is a
remarkably diverse little corner of the world. For example, Foz de Iguacu is
populated by 65 different nationalities, including about 7,000 Lebanese,
30,000 Chinese, and 4,000 Koreans. In addition, the TBA has one of the
largest Arab populations outside the Middle East. A 2001 report suggests
that the TBA’s population includes 23,000 Arabs of Palestinian and
Lebanese descent. The area was marked by a significant Lebanese
emigration during the 1970s civil war in Lebanon. In Ciudad del Este and
Foz do Iguacu, 90% of the Arab population is of Lebanese descent.
Ciudad del Este is a South American version of Casablanca in the 1940s.
The city is populated with intelligence agents and their informants. Human
traffickers, arms merchants and drug traffickers are omnipresent. On the
city’s streets everything from the newest pirated computer software, to
prostituted children, to AK-47s are easily obtainable. An AK-47 sells in the
street bazaars for $375. The city is also a prominent banking and retail
center. In fact, Ciudad del Este’s retail economy is the third strongest in the
world, ranking right behind Hong Kong and Miami. The city has a bigger
retail economy than the rest of Paraguay combined. Lebanese and
Palestinians operate many of the commercial enterprises in Ciudad del Este
although they tend to reside in the Foz do Iguacu area of Brazil.
State Corruption
In many ways it is difficult to determine which of the three countries
touching at the TBA is the most corrupt. Carlos Menem, the president of
Argentina has resisted any attempts to reform the government and the courts.

Menem has also been alleged to have been involved in a government coverup of a bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires and arms
trafficking. Menem, whose parents were Syrian immigrants to Argentina,
appointed a Syrian army colonel as the head of customs at Buenos Aires’
Ezeiza International Airport, one of the prime smuggling entrepots in South
America.
In Brazil, an investigation by the Brazilian Congress in 2000, implicated
congressmen, state governors, mayors, judges, and police officials in a series
of criminal activities including arms and drug trafficking and tax evasion.
That report suggested that Brazil’s entire police structure had to be torn
down and reconfigured because of the pervasive drug-related corruption. A
congressional investigation in 2002 implicated over 100 politicians, police,
and businessmen in a massive cargo theft enterprise.
Immigration fraud is abetted by pervasive corruption in the government of
Paraguay. One investigation found that annually an average of 570
individuals enters Paraguay through the Ciudad del Este Airport with forged
passports, visas, or identity documents. That investigation found that a bribe
of $5000 was sufficient to circumvent immigration controls. More recent
investigations have centered on the ease with which Lebanese citizens have
been able to enter Paraguay with false documentation. Ahmad Assad
Barabat, a regional Hizballah leader, entered Paraguay with a false visa
issued in Panama. The Paraguayan consul in Miami, Carlos Weis sold more
than 300 passports, visas and bills of lading between 1999 and 2002.
Obviously, the fidelity, honesty and effectiveness of police forces are central
to controlling organized criminal activities. Police corruption is a prime
precondition for large-scale organized crime activity. Many issues help
explain the total lack of effectiveness of the Argentinian police against
organized crime. First, the government is far more interested in repressing
political dissent and maintaining public order than in fighting crime. Second,
the Argentine judiciary moves with great deliberation at a snail-like pace,
which is frustrating to many police. As a result police frequently are
engaged in brutality, framing suspects, and even murders and rapes. Finally,
Argentinian police are paid the equivalent of about $400 a month. For these
reasons and many others, corruption is pervasive in the Argentinian security
forces.

But problems with corruption only begin to describe the difficulties of the
Argentine police. Since at least the 1970s the Argentine police have been
integrally involved in organized crime activities, including prostitution,
gambling and kidnapping. The Brazilian police are similarly hampered by
widespread corruption and human rights abuses. Brazilian state police
forces have engaged in widespread murder, torture, and rape. They
routinely detain people without arrest outside of the law. Death-squad
activity and vigilantism is epidemic in Brazilian policing. In addition,
Brazilian police have been implicated in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and
murder-for-hire schemes. Similarly, the Paraguayan police routinely engage
in torture; death squad activities; the use of excessive force; illegal
detention; and, wanton violations of privacy rights. Paraguayan police also
engage in large-scale extortion from both legitimate and illegitimate
businessmen, particularly Arabs and others of foreign descent. The police
force of Ciudad del Este is widely regarded as pervasively corrupt. Law
enforcement largely depends on private security services. All of the 6,000
stores and shops, the 36 banks and the 15 money exchanges in the city
employ private guards.
Organizing Crime in the TBA
The TBA is a perfect environment for thriving illicit enterprises and the
operations of organized crime groups. Money laundering laws are lax. The
governments and police forces are thoroughly corrupt. Unregulated
commerce thrives. Immigration controls are easily circumvented. As a
result a confluence of both indigenous and transnational organized crime
groups has set up operation in the area. Criminal organizations engaged in
the trafficking of drugs, guns, children and women flourish. Financial and
business crimes are easily conducted. Smuggling of stolen goods and
counterfeiting of other products occurs without interference. While
organized crime in the TBA may be thought of as in its developmental
stages, the conditions for the success of these incipient enterprises are all
present.
Luiz Fernando Da Costa heads one of the local organized crime groups. For
years Da Costa ran a criminal organization in Brazil that traded arms for
cocaine. Da Costa operated in the TBA until 2001. Since then he is rumored
to have moved his base of operation of Colombia. Organized crime in
Brazil has become much bolder and more violent in recent years. In 2002 the
country narrowly averted an attempt by organized crime to bomb the Sao

Paulo Stock Exchange. In 2003, drug organizations engaged in running
battles with police in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, snarling traffic and
paralyzing the city’s business district. Also in 2003 organized crime groups
assassinated two Brazilian judges. Additionally, Brazil’s most prominent
prison gang has close ties to both Da Costa and to Italian organized crime
figures. In the TBA, organized crime gunmen attempted the assassination of
the Foz do Iguaca city council president.
Cuidad del Este is, for all intents and purposes, a free trade zone for
organized crime. Money laundering, the theft of intellectual property, human
trafficking, alien smuggling, arms trafficking and drug trafficking all
flourish. A significant portion of the illicit market revolves around trades of
drugs for arms involving Colombian organized crime and political groups.
One of the largest criminal organizations in the Ciudad del Este area is the
arms trafficking syndicate run by Elvio Ramon Contero Aguero, out of the
town of Pedro Juan Caballero on the Brazilian border. General Lino Cesar
Oviedo, the head of the Paraguayan Cartel is also based in Ciudad del Este
and Foz do Iguacu. The Paraguayan Cartel was responsible for multi-ton
cocaine shipments originating in the TBA during the 1990s, as well as for
massive money laundering operations in the TBA. Closely associated with
the activities of the Paraguayan Cartel is Paraguayan General Jose Tomas
Centurion.
In addition to local generals and crime lords, criminal syndicates from
around the world operate in the TBA, in close association with Paraguayan
businessmen, politicians, the military, and the ruling Colorado Party.
Colombian, Italian and Nigerian organized crime groups all operate in the
TBA.
The social demography of Ciudad del Este makes it a perfect location for the
operations of Chinese organized crime groups, including the Fuk Ching, Big
Circle Boys, Flying Dragons and Tai Chen. Chinese organized crime groups
run protection rackets in Ciudad del Este’s Chinese community and engage
in large-scale trafficking in counterfeit products. In addition, Korean
organized crime groups with branches in Ciudad del Este, San Francisco,
Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, and Santa Cruz (Bolivia), are active in the region.
Two Canton-based Chinese organized crime groups, the Fu Shin and the Fei
Jeii are also active in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu. Chinese organized
crime groups have been able to maintain virtual immunity from prosecution
in the TBA because of bribes paid to Paraguayan judges. Several other

Chinese organized crime groups in the TBA deal primarily in
counterfeiting. The Sung-I and Ming groups have worked closely in the
Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya (a group closely associated with Hizballah) in a
product-counterfeiting scheme.
Russian organized crime groups have initiated activities in Paraguay as well,
primarily with the intention of trafficking cocaine to Europe, although they
appear not to be setting up permanent operations in the TBA. Russian
organized crime groups have also opened up contacts in Brazil with the
intent of procuring Brazilian women for prostitution operations in Israel. The
Russian groups may well be paying for drugs and women with arms. In the
late 1990s AK-47s and AR-15s have become more and more common as the
weapons for choice for indigenous organized groups in the TBA and
adjoining countries. Chechen organized crime groups have also made
contact with drug traffickers and money launderers in the TBA from their
base in Argentina. Presumably, the Chechen are attempting to open up
another guns-for-drug conduit through the TBA.
Organized Crime Enterprises in the TBA
The three countries, which converge in the TBA, have similar characteristics
with regard to the drug business. Argentina is not known as a drug
producing country, but it does serve as a transshipment conduit for cocaine
from Bolivia and heroin from Colombia. Brazil acts as a middleman in the
trade between Western European nations and the United States in the
precursor chemicals essential to the production of methamphetamine.
Paraguay also serves as a transshipment site for cocaine moving out of Peru.
The TBA is primarily an area through which drugs destined for Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay pass. The existence of more than 100 clandestine
airstrips in the TBA enhances its utility as a transit point for both drugs and
arms. This is particularly the case with cocaine, which is usually moved by
small aircraft.
About $12 billion in illicit profits are laundered each year in the TBA.
Money launderers use the banks and currency exchange businesses in
Cuidad del Este and Fdoz do Iguaca to engage in fraudulent financial
transactions. Money laundering activity is pervasive in the financial
industry, particularly through Brazilian and Paraguayan banks operating in
the TBA. The Central Bank of Brazil estimates that 17 percent of the profits
generated by Colombian drug cartels are laundered through the Brazilian

bank system. Brazilian investigators estimate that 40 percent of the local
businesses in Foz do Iguaca and nothing more than fronts established by
organized crime groups for the purpose of laundering money. Paraguay is
internationally recognized as a major money-laundering center. Almost all
of Paraguay’s $5 billion money laundering activity occurs in Ciudad del
Este.
The theft, smuggling and transport of luxury cars is also a major business in
the TBA. Cars that are stolen in Brazil and Argentina are moved to
Paraguay, Bolivia, and other points of embarkation through the TBA. More
than half of the 450,000 vehicles registered by drivers in Paraguay are
acquired through illegal channels. Stolen automobiles and other contraband
pass along an illegally opened road cutting through the Iguau National Park.
The Asuncion-Paraguayan Highway is also a major conduit for contraband.
Counterfeiting and pirating commercial products is also a booming business
in the TBA. More than half of all the business software utilized in Brazil is
pirated. Forty percent of the cigarettes entering Brazil are illegal contraband
smuggled into the country. The large Arab community in the TBA seems to
dominate the black market in counterfeit and pirated goods. Some
investigators have suggested that bootlegged computer software and CDs are
used to raise money for Hizballah and Hamas. Ciudad del Este is the major
transshipment point for counterfeit CDs and CD-ROMs entering South
America from Hong Kong, Macau, Malaysia and Thailand. About $1.5
billion worth of these counterfeits move through Ciudad del Este each year.
Estimates suggest that 90 percent of the commercial goods sold by stores,
street vendors, and other agents in Cuidad del Este are counterfeit.
Paraguayan law permits patents to be issued for international brand names
by the National Brand Register, thereby facilitating the pirating of
contraband merchandise. Much of the counterfeiting activity is directly
linked to organized crime groups operating in Korea, Lebanon and Taiwan.
The International Intellectual Property Alliance has identified Paraguay as
their most serious problem nation.
Conclusion
Social, political, economic and geographic variables have come together to
create a perfect environment for sustaining organized crime in the TBA.
The TBA is distant from other major population centers, and far from the
seat of state power in any of the three affected nations. But even if it weren’t
geographically isolated, the pervasive political and law enforcement

corruption which defines the state in Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina would
still be a significant contributor to the creation of an organized crime
entrepot. Lack of banking regulations and extremely permissive banking
enforcement in Brazil and Paraguay create a perfect environment for money
laundering, which in turn fosters the drug and arms markets. The same
preconditions, which have sustained indigenous organized crime, create an
attractive environment for the operations of transnational criminal
organizations.
The essential unanswered question, however, is whether this set of
circumstances is simply a happy coincidence for organized crime or whether
its genesis has more sinister roots. It strains credulity to suggest that tens of
thousands of Lebanese Arabs, Taiwanese and Koreans simply happened to
wander into this South American backwater. In fact, it strains credulity to
suggest that they even knew of Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu, let alone
the no doubt beautiful Iguaza Falls.
So how did this organized crime boomtown come to pass? On that point
there is scant evidence. It is possible that transnational organized crime
groups did identify the potential for the area as a result of their normal
course of business, which particularly in the case of the Taiwanese may have
involved Paraguay. It is harder to explain the Arab migration to the jungles
of the TBA. The U.S. government seems to suspect that this may be part of
a master plan to fund Islamic extremist groups through illicit enterprise. But
the existence of many, many lawless states closer to the Middle East still
makes it difficult to conclude that the obvious location for such a complex
and sinister plot was a remote corner of Paraguay. Other speculations are
also possible. We have seen over the decades the hidden hand of the CIA
and the Mossad nudging some organized criminal enterprises into action for
a specific purpose. The answer may lie in a combination of all these things.
But at the moment, the mystery of South America’s 21st Century Casablanca
is just that, a mystery.

